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In accordance with Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State Appellees respectfully petition the Court to
grant a rehearing and to reconsider its decision in this case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court reversed the trial court's granting of our motion
to dismiss, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
the Court's opinion of April 12, 1990.

We respectfully submit

that the Court's decision arguably:
(1)

inverts the burden of proof;

(2)

substantially merges tort and "takings" jurisprudence;

practically abolishes sovereign immunity for most tort claims;
and disallows dispositive motions against "takings" claims;
(3)

unreasonably burdens governmental response to emergen-

cies; and
(4)

largely disestablishes the State's public-trust author-

ity, and reduces the Public Trust Doctrine to a nuisance concept.
In addition, the Court's opinion does not address Colman's
Fifth Amendment claim, which claim we think the trial court
should not consider.

(We reassert the authorities presented in

the State's briefs.)

We respectfully request the Court's advice.

We think the trial court should be affirmed as a matter of
law, and we respectfully request the Court's reconsideration.

1

ARGUMENT
1.

BURDEN OF PROOF

The Court's opinion arguably inverts the burden of proof.
We respectfully request clarification.
At page 5 of the slip opinion, the Court states:

"Colman

can only recover for the taking of property to the extent that
property exists and to the extent he has legal rights in that
property."

We agree.

However, the opinion's immediately preced-

ing sentence arguably suggests the burden of proof is on the
State:

"Colman cannot recover if the State proves that in fact

there was no canal or that Colman had no legal rights in the
canal."

Id. (emphasis added).

We wonder if the Court really intended to reverse the burden
of proof.

"The rule placing the burden upon the landowner has

come down to us from early times in this jurisdiction."

State

Road Commission v. Taqcrart, 19 Utah 2d 247, 430 P.2d 167, 170
(1967); also see State v. Howes, 20 Utah 2d 246, 436 P.2d 803,
804 (1968); and Utah State Road Commfn v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821,
832 (Utah 1984).

It is the property owner's burden to prove a

"taking" by at least a preponderance of the evidence. 1

1

In Taggart, supra, this Court affirmed jury instructions
that imposed on the landowner "the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the value of the land taken." 43 0
P.2d at 170. If the Court had needed to direct the trial court
on remand, perhaps the Court would have directed that a higher
(continued...)
2

1

(...continued)
burden be imposed on the property owner. (No remand was necessary because the Court affirmed, concluding that n the jury was
not misdirected by the court's instructions." Id.) Other
jurisdictions impose substantially higher burdens on the property
owner.
We give the following cases as examples (all emphasis
added): Matter of Egg Harbor A s s o c , 94 N.J. 358, 464 A.2d 1115,
1123 (N.J. 1983) ("The burden of demonstrating that a taking has
occurred lies upon the party alleging that the state action is
unconstitutional. Proof must be by clear and convincing evidence."); De St. Aubin v. Flacke, 68 N.Y.2d 66, 496 N.E.2d 879,
885 (N.Y. 1986) ("A landowner who claims that land regulation has
effected a taking of his property bears the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to the
regulation and of proving every element of his claim beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citations.] That burden remains upon him
throughout the case and never shifts to the State."); Commonwealth Dept. of Transportation v. Kemp, 515 A.2d 68, 71
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1986) ("In order for a condemnee to prove that a de
facto taking has occurred, he must show exceptional circumstances
which have substantially deprived him of the use and enjoyment of
his property. * * * [A]nd that the damages sustained by the
condemnee were the immediate, necessary and unavoidable consequence of that exercise."); Estate of Scott v. Victoria County,
778 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tex.App. 1989) ("extraordinary burden");
McCracken v. City of Philadelphia, 451 A.2d 1046, 1048
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1982) ("Where a de facto taking is alleged, the
property owner bears a heavy burden of proof. [Citation.] He
must show * * * exceptional circumstances * * * . " ) .
Other cases holding that the property owner has the burden
of proof include: Ario v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 367
N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 1985); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707
P.2d 717, 731 (Wyo. 1985) ("The plaintiff has the burden of
establishing these [takings] claims. If he fails to do it, the
court will not presume the impact."); City of Sierra Vista v.
Cochise Enterprises, 144 Ariz. 375, 697 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Ariz.
App. 1984); Mabe v. State, 385 P.2d 401, 406 (Idaho 1963);
Anderson v. County of Santa Cruz, 344 P.2d 421, 425 (Cal.App.
1959) ("the plaintiff must show not only a taking or damaging for
a public use but also that it is actionable under the general
(continued...)
3

The just-cited Utah cases involved "straight" condemnation
(i.e., the State initiated formal legal action to condemn property) .

Even in straight condemnation cases, the property owner has

the burden of proof with respect to the existence and value of
his property.

And that is all the more necessary when (as here)

the property owner is the plaintiff.

lf

[T]he rule followed by

most of the authorities putting the burden of proving his right
to compensation or damages on the landowner has been held to be
particularly applicable in cases of inverse condemnation."

27

AmJur2d, Eminent Domain, sec. 505, p. 461 (emphasis added).
Having alleged inverse condemnation, Colman (not the State)
has the burden of proof.

And his first burden, of course, is to

prove his alleged "property" existed.
We respectfully ask the Court to consider modifying its
opinion to emphasize that Colman has the affirmative burden of
proving a taking of his property.

1

(...continued)
law."); Price v. City of Junction, 711 F.2d 582, 591 (5th Cir.
1983); Foster v. United States, 2 Cl.Ct. 426, 445 (1983) ("The
burden of establishing the value of the property taken rests upon
the claimant. As a general rule, there is no compensation for
frustrated contracts or for loss of future income. The sovereign
must pay only for what it takes, not for opportunities the owner
loses.").
4

2.

"DAMAGE" AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

We fear the Court's discussion of "damaged11 (Article I,
Section 22, Utah Constitution) will have these effects:

(a)

those with property-related tort claims against governmental
entities will plead their claims as "takings" because (b) "takings" claims automatically defeat sovereign immunity; and (c) all
of that will impair government and disserve the public interest.
For the reasons given in our briefs, we respectfully ask the
Court to reconsider its decision and opinion, and to affirm the
trial court's judgment that there was no taking here and that the
State has sovereign immunity.

Otherwise, we ask the Court to

modify its opinion, to emphasize that torts cannot succeed as
"takings" claims, and to preserve immunity against tort claims.
a.
We fear that almost any damage to "property" will be pled as
a taking (and it will require little imagination to characterize
most torts as invading or violating some "property" interest).
The Utah Constitution will indeed have become an unfortunate
"font of tort law."

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).

We do not think the Court intends that effect, and we
respectfully request appropriate limiting language.

5

b.
We also think the Court's opinion may practically abolish
sovereign immunity for tort claims.

The Court has held that

government has no immunity against inverse condemnation claims;
and we fear that, by careful pleading, future litigants might
succeed in transforming most torts into takings—leaving governmental entities without immunity as a matter of constitutional
law.

The Legislature then would have little or no right to

provide for governmental immunity; only a constitutional amendment could reinstate immunity against tort claims (i.e., against
tort claims pled as takings).
We respectfully ask the Court to include in its opinion
clarifying language that would preclude such possibilities.
c.
We submit that, whether intended or not, the arguable merger
of "takings" and tort jurisprudence and the accompanying loss of
sovereign immunity will harm the public interest.
Governmental entities (the State, counties, towns, and
special districts) may become less willing to act, and may avoid
addressing emergencies.

They might fear that whatever they do

will lead to their being sued for a "taking."
And once they are sued, it seems they may be penalized yet
again.

The costs of trial can be devastating (especially to
6

local governments and special districts); but they may not be
able to avoid trial, for lower courts might surmise from the
Court f s opinion that dispositive motions on the pleadings should
not be granted against inverse condemnation claims.

As a practi-

cal matter, in terms of intimidation and financial costs and lost
time and resources, governmental entities may "lose" even when
they ultimately win at trial.
We think all claims—including "takings" claims—should be
dismissed when they cannot be sustained as a matter of law.
"Takings" are easily alleged; but, no matter how nicely pled,
insubstantial allegations should not command a trial.
We submit that, by including additional limitations and
clarification in its opinion, this Court can obviate much unnecessary litigation on these issues.
3.

EMERGENCIES

Floodwaters created an emergency all around the lake, and
breaching the causeway mitigated that emergency.

The lav; long

has insulated government from claims arising from emergency
action, and we think the Court has reaffirmed that established
principle here.

Nevertheless, we respectfully ask the Court to

clarify its opinion on certain points that might be confusing to
lower courts.

7

a.
The Court directs the trial court to apply the "emergency"
rule if the governmental action was necessary.

Slip op. 11.

We

agree the emergency rule applies only in cases of necessity.2
However, while recognizing that government is not liable in cases
of necessary emergency-response (slip op. 9-11), the Court
incongruously directs the trial court to "determine whether
Colman's canal would have been in danger without the breach."
Id. at 9.

We have several concerns about that.

We think it irrelevant to consider whether the canal was in
danger.

When faced with an emergency, government should not be

required to stop and deliberate over whether it can act to remedy
the emergency or whether it must not act until it has determined
that the emergency itself will damage particular property.
Imposing such a burden could stymie the response, exacerbate the
emergency, and enlarge the destruction.
Moreover, this concept (that the emergency rule applies
only if Colman's ditch inevitably would be destroyed anyway) has

z

Breaching the causeway was necessary to counteract the
flood emergency. In the Great Salt Lake Causeway Act (H.B. 30,
1984 Budget Session), the Legislature made specific findings
about the "extraordinary flooding conditions" and the need for
the breach. Those legislative findings demonstrate an emergency
and are conclusive on the question of "necessity.fl Idaho State
AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129, 1136 (Idaho 1986). The emergency rule clearly applies and, we submit, this Court can and should
affirm the trial court as a matter of law.
8

no apparent precedent.

The Court's cited cases hold in favor of

the government; because they involved emergency-response, as a
matter of law the government's actions did not constitute a
compensable taking.

Those cases hardly afford an exception in

Colman's favor.3
And, simply, the Court's directive (to determine whether the
ditch was in danger even without the breach) does not jibe with
the Court's conclusion that the emergency rule applies in cases
of "necessity."

Breaching the causeway was necessary, and that

3

. The Court (slip op. 9) cites United States v. Caltex, 344
U.S. 149 (1952), and Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146
(1924). Each case held there was no compensable taking and
neither case purported to base its holding on the proposition
that the emergency alone would have destroyed the property.
Indeed, Caltex clearly did not rely on that distinction. Caltex
was decided expressly on the basis of U.S. v. Pacific R. Co., 120
U.S. 227 (1887), which "involved bridges which had been destroyed
during the * * * [Civil War] by a retreating Northern Army to
impede the advance of the Confederate Army." 344 U.S. at 153,
154. The bridge was destroyed—and there was no "taking" as a
matter of law—irrespective of whether the bridge (the property
claimed to have been taken) was itself in danger by virtue of the
advancing army. Indeed, the emergency (the advancing army) would
not have destroyed the bridge; so this case clearly undercuts
Colman's argument. Simply, as Caltex notes, government can,
"with immunity," destroy property as necessary to meet an emergency. 344 U.S. at 154.
And while the land in Sanguinetti would have been flooded
even if the government had not built the canal, that clearly
played no role in the Supreme Court's decision. It found no
taking irrespective of that fact. Besides, Sanguinetti is
otherwise inapposite to Colman's argument for an exception to the
emergency rule, because it is not an emergency case (the government was not responding to an emergency). Neither Caltex nor
Sanguinetti affords the distinction Colman asserts against the
"emergency" rule.
9

fact is separate and unrelated to the question of whether the
floodwaters would have damaged Colman's ditch.
The emergency rule is vital, but will be quite empty if it
applies only to property that will be destroyed by the emergency
in any event.

For this and the foregoing reasons, we ask the

Court to disavow this "distinction11 briefly discussed in the slip
opinion at 9.
b.
We submit the Court has misapplied Miller v. Schoene and
Teresi v. State.

Slip op. 9.

Those cases clearly support the

principle that the State cannot be liable for emergency actions.
Though the Court supports the emergency rule with other authorities, the Court's opinion does not relate those two cases to the
emergency rule "because they involve questions of proper regulation and the use of the police power" and because "[t]hese cases
do not involve a direct physical taking, as is alleged in this
case."

Id.

We respectfully disagree and ask the Court to recon-

sider.
We agree those two cases involved an exercise of police
power, but that is no distinction.

Our breaching of the causeway

also was the work of police power.

Indeed, every governmental

emergency-action will be an exercise of police power.

10

And, contrary to the Court's discussion, we respectfully
suggest that those cases more clearly involved "a direct physical
taking" than does the instant case.

In Miller, the state de-

stroyed "a large number of ornamental red cedar trees growing on
[the plaintiff's] property."

276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928).

In

Teresi, "the state ordered that the [plaintiff!s crop of] peppers
be fumigated * * *, which caused them to rot within 10 days."
180 Cal.App.3d 239, 225 Cal.Rptr. 517, 518 (1986).
Colman f s claim of physical interference is no stronger than
the utter destruction that occurred in Miller and Teresi.

And in

each of those cases the state was not liable because it was
responding to an emergency.

Teresi, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 519.

Colman's claim should likewise fail as a matter of law.
In sum, we believe Miller and Teresi fully support the
emergency rule and defeat Colman!s claim; and we respectfully ask
the Court to reconsider its opinion in that regard.
4.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Respectfully, we believe the Court has misapprehended the
Public Trust Doctrine and Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892).

The Court also has misunderstood the

State's position.
After briefly discussing the Public Trust Doctrine, the
Court states:
11

This case, however, presents a different problem.
The State has already exercised its powers under the
public trust in leasing the canal on the bed of the
lake to Colman. Now, the State wishes to revoke that
grant without compensation to Colman. The State
maintains that it can do so since it holds the waters
of the lake under the public trust. In taking such a
position, the State essentially argues that it originally acted without authority in granting the lease to
Colman.
Slip opinion at 21 (emphasis added).
a.
We respectfully disagree.

First, the State has not argued

that it originally acted without authority in granting the lease
to Colman.

Nor have we sought to revoke the lease.

we stated in our primary brief (at 38 n.21):

Rather, as

"We have never said

he cannot have his ditch, but only that his ditch cannot supersede the State f s public-trust action."
That is still our position.

The State clearly had authority

to issue Colmanfs lease and to make other provisions on the lake
in the public interest.

The State had authority to grant South-

ern Pacific an easement for the causeway, and when floodwaters
grossly enlarged the lake, the State had authority to mitigate
damage by helping breach the causeway.

The parties might dis-

agree about the effect of the breach, but neither Colman nor the
State has doubted the State f s authority to issue the lease.
think the Court has fundamentally misunderstood the State ! s

12

We

position and has otherwise based its decision on misapprehended
considerations, also including those discussed below.
b.
The Court's above-quoted paragraph arguably implies that
once the State exercises its public-trust authority, it is not
free to take later action that might conflict with the first
action.

That, we respectfully submit, is neither the law nor

good policy.
Specifically, the Court's opinion seems to assume that if
the first public-trust action (leasing to Colman) and the later
public-trust action (breaching the causeway) somehow conflict,
then one of those actions must be deemed unauthorized (or the
lease must be deemed "revoked").

Slip opinion at 21.

Such a view, we fear, would disestablish ongoing publictrust authority.

The first interest granted in the lake or

lakebed would thereafter give that grantee (or lessee) power to
control the lake.

It would effectively "freeze" the State from

taking any further action if the grantee might object to it.
(This would be contrary not only to the Public Trust Doctrine,
but also to the "Salt Cases" discussed in our briefs.

See Brief

of State Respondents 36-39; and State Respondents1 Supplemental
Brief 43, 44, 62. )

13

c.
We submit the Court's decision also misapprehends Illinois
Central, in which the Supreme Court stated:

"The question * * *

to be considered is * * * whether the railroad corporation can
hold the [submerged] lands and control the waters by the grant,
against any future exercise of power over them by the State. If
146 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added).

The Court held no.

Without doubt, the State may issue a lease like Colman's,
at least when it can be done "without detriment to the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining."
quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 456.

Slip opinion at 22,
But the point is:

the lease cannot prevail "against any future exercise of power
over [the lake] by the State."

14 6 U.S. at 4 52.

We submit this

Court has misunderstood that central point and has misapplied
Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine.
Illinois Central held that the 1873 state legislature was
free to repeal the grant made to the railroad by the 1869 legislative act.

146 U.S. at 460.

"[R]epealing the same is valid and

effective * * * [to] restor[e] to the State the same control,
dominion and ownership of [the submerged] lands that it had prior
to the [1869] act * * *."

146 U.S. at 463-64.

In our case, the Legislature specifically "declare[d] it [to
be] in the public interest and a public purpose to breach the
causeway."

Great Salt Lake Causeway Act, sec. 1 (H.B. 30, 1984
14

Budget Session).
proper.

Breaching the causeway was necessary and

And because the State had public-trust authority to

exercise "the same control, dominion and ownership of said lands
[including Colman's lakebed ditch] that it had prior to" issuance
of the lease, 146 U.S. at 464, Colman can state no claim as a
matter of law.
d.
It is Colman's lease, not the State's public-trust interests, that must yield under Illinois Central and the other cases
cited in our briefs.
ride the public trust.

Colman has his lease, but it cannot overAs Illinois Central shows, Colman would

have no cause of action if the State had revoked the lease, and
he certainly has no claim against the State in this case.
e.
The Court states that "there is nothing to show that Colman's canal impaired the public interest in any way at the time
the State granted him the right to conduct his operation."
op. at 22.

Slip

We respectfully submit that, for the reasons dis-

cussed above, as a matter of law it is irrelevant whether the
canal ever impaired the public interest.

That is not an issue.

We fear the Court's opinion reduces the Public Trust Doctrine to a nuisance-abatement doctrine, at most.

The Court

apparently would deny the State's public-trust authority simply
15

upon a finding that Colman f s ditch was not a nuisance.
Public Trust Doctrine concerns far more than nuisances.

But the
If the

State could exercise public-trust authority only to abate nuisances, there would be no distinct public-trust authority.

(The

State can abate nuisances without public-trust authority.)

We

urge the Court not to diminish or disestablish the public trust. 4
f.
Colman located on the bed of the Great Salt Lake subject to
public-trust authority.

When the State exercised that authority

to mitigate flooding, as a matter of law the State did so without
liability to Colman.
We respectfully ask the Court to consider whether it has
misapplied Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine.

We

4

The excerpt from Illinois Central (slip op. 22) does not
address our case. That excerpt notes merely that sovereign
lands cannot be alienated except when it can be done without
detriment to the public interest.
From that, this Court apparently would dispose of the
public-trust issue by simply asking the trial court to determine
whether Colman!s ditch impaired the public interest at the time
the lease was granted.
(Slip op. 22.) However, that addresses a
non-issue, for no one has ever argued that the ditch was a
detriment at that time. And such a consideration would be
irrelevant, anyv/ay, for public-trust authority does not depend on
whether or not the ditch impaired any public interest.
We respectfully ask the Court not to dispose of this important matter on the basis of an immaterial point.
16

submit that the trial court correctly dismissed Colman's claim
as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision represents a substantial change in the
law, and there is reason to reconsider this case on the State's
Petition For Rehearing.

The State's Petition should be granted.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this May
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
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STEWART, Justice:
William J. Colman filed an action against the Utah
State Land Board and against Ralph Miles, Director of the Utah
Division of State Lands-and-Forestry-of the Department o£
Natural Resources—(-referr^d~-to~coll^ct-i-vely--^s—"the-~State!L)-,
and against Southern Pacific Transportation Company for the
destruction of an underwater brine canal Colman maintained on
the bed of the Great Salt Lake, The trial court dismissed the
complaint, and Colman appealed.
I•

FACTS

This case arose out of the breach of the Great Salt
Lake causeway on August 1, 1984, The causeway is a raised bed

of fill which crosses the lake in an east-west direction.
Southern Pacific runs a railroad line over the causeway. The
causeway was constructed in 1959 by Southern Pacific after
obtaining a right-of-way for its construction from the state of
Utah.
The Great Salt Lake Causeway Act (the "Act"), 1984
Utah Laws ch. 32, enacted during the 1984 budget session of the
Utah legislature, authorized breaching the causeway as a
response to the rapid rise of the water level in the lake.
During this same session, the legislature amended the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act to limit the liability of
governmental entities for management of flood waters. Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-3; 1984 Utah Laws ch. 33, § 1.
Prior to the breach of the causeway by the State and
Southern Pacific, Colman operated and maintained a five-milelong underwater brine canal running parallel to and
approximately 1,300 feet north of the causeway. The canal was
authorized by a lease and easement granted by the State. The
brine canal was used in Colman's business of extracting
minerals from deep lake brines.
On July 20, 1984, Colman filed a complaint in the
Third District Court seeking (1) to enjoin the State and
Southern Pacific from breaching the causeway, and (2) to
recover monetary damages for the damage the breach would cause
his property if the court did not grant the injunction.
Colman's mineral extraction operation was located on
the western shore of the lake. The canal began near that point
and ran five miles eastward into the lake. Colman alleged that
for his mineral extraction operation to be economically
feasible, it was necessary for him to draw brines from the
deeper strata of the lake, where the brines are more dense.
His complaint alleged that he had dredged and maintained the
canal so that its bottom^was at_a__const.ant_elevation. Colman
alleged that the canal made it possible for him to pump the
deep-water brines into his mineral extraction operation.
Colman alleged that the breach of the causeway would
cause water from the south arm of the lake to flow through the
breach under great pressure and cut through the canal banks.
He also claimed that the breach would create turbidity and
sedimentation, making__the_use„ of the^canal as_a _brine_condu.it
impossible.
The trial court denied Colman*s motion for a
preliminary injunction on July 31, 1984, after an evidentiary
hearing, and the causeway was breached the following day. On
August 20, 1984, the State filed a motion to dismiss Colman*s
damage claims. That motion was granted by the trial court
May 2, 1986. The trial court concluded that (1) the Utah
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Governmental Immunity Act immunized the State from liability,
(2) the breach of the causeway was a valid exercise of the
police powers of the State, (3) the breach of the causeway was
in furtherance of the State's public trust responsibilities,
and (4) there was no compensable taking of a property
interest.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted
by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of its claim. Liquor Control Comm'n v.
Athas r 121 Utah 457, 460, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952)- The courts
are a forum for settling controversies, and if there is any
doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of
a factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of
giving the party an opportunity to present its proof. Baur v.
Pacific Fin. Corp., 14 Utah 2d 283, 284, 383 P.2d 397, 397
(1963). On this appeal, we look solely to the material
allegations of Colman's complaint, not to the evidence
presented at the preliminary injunction hearing. In their
briefs and at oral argument, the State and Southern Pacific
rely extensively on the evidence presented at the preliminary
injunction hearing to support their position. We do not,
however, consider this evidence on this appeal. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b). Coiman's complaint was dismissed on a rule 12
motion to dismiss. When reviewing a dismissal based on
rule 12, an appellate court must accept the material
allegations of the complaint as true, Petersen v. Jones, 16
Utah 2d 121, 122, 396 P.2d 748, 748 (1964), and the trial
court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears
that Colman can prove no set of facts in support of his claim.
Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935,
936 (Utah 1988); Freeaard v. First Western Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d
614, 616 (Utah 1987); Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 590
P.2d 1261, 1263 (Utah 1979).
The State argues in its supplemental brief that
*[t]here is no virtue in rigid adherence to a technical rule
that has no practical bearing on the proper outcome of a
particular case." We decline to follow the State's suggestion
that we should ignore the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
"technical rule" the State refers to is found in rule 12(b),
which provides that"a motion to dismiss'for failure-to state a
claim upon which "relief can "be "granted" shall" be_tTeBted~as~"a
motion for summary judgment under rule 56 if matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.
However, the rule provides that if a motion to dismiss is
converted to a motion for summary judgment, it must only be
done so as to not create procedural prejudice to one of the
parties. The rule states, "[A]11 parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent
3
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to such a motion by Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This
rule gives the opposing party an opportunity to gather evidence
to rebut the movant's evidence. Without such a rule, one party
could have the benefit of significant, supporting evidence
while the other party would be left to rely solely on the
unsubstantiated pleadings.
This rule has much "practical bearing on the proper
outcome" of this case. The State and Southern Pacific moved
for dismissal based on Colman's failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Colman responded to these
motions with a memorandum opposing the motions to dismiss,
which focused exclusively on points of law. Colman appears to
have assumed at that point that the rule 12 standard would be
followed. His memorandum began by stating, "For purposes of a
motion to dismiss, the truth of the Complaint's fact
allegations must be assumed." Colman was not given reasonable
opportunity to present additional evidence pursuant to
rule 12(b). Had Colman known that the State would rely on the
preliminary injunction evidence, he could have submitted other
evidence to the trial court rebutting that evidemce.
Furthermore, the trial court treated the motion^to
dismiss only under rule 12 and not under rule 56. The trial
court did not make any factual findings in denying Colman's
motion for a preliminary injunction. The trial court
specifically stated that it only ruled that plaintiff had not
met his burden of proof for a preliminary injunction and that
its ruling was not dispositive of any other issues. The trial
court also refused to order Colman to order the transcript of
the preliminary injunction proceedings for this appeal. In
granting the State's motion to dismiss, the trial court only
entered conclusions of law.
Finally, if a trial court cannot on its own motion
convert a rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment, Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 2 5 Utah 2d 121,
123, 477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970), then certainly we should not
allow the moving party to do so on appeal.
III.

TAKING OR DAMAGING PROPERTY

A. Was Colman's canal "property" for purposes of article I,
gectiQn 22?
Article I, section" 22~ofTthe Utah Constitution
provides, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation." A claimant must possess
some protectible interest in property before that interest is
entitled to recover under this provision. Colman alleged that
the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry granted him, as
part of a lease with the state, an easement for the maintenance
and operation of the canal. It has always been accepted in
No. 860331

4

this state that even an implied easement is a property interest
protectible under article I, section 22. Utah State Road
Comm'n v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974); Hampton v.
State ex rel. Road Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 345, 445 P.2d 708,
710 (1968); Doolv Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah
31, 37, 33 P. 229, 231-32 (1893). An express easement, such as
that alleged by Colman, is also "private property" for the
purposes of article I, section 22. See Whiterocks Irrigation
Co. v. Mooseman, 45 Utah 79, 79-80, 141 P. 459, 460 (1914);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2(2) (Supp. 1989). Nichols on Eminent
Domain states, "An easement is an interest in land, and it is
taken in the constitutional sense when the land over which it
is exercised is taken; but if it is only destroyed and ended, a
destruction for public purposes may also be an appropriation
for the same purpose." 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.14, at
5-186 (3d ed. 1989) (citing United States v. Welch, 217 U.S.
333, 339 (1910)).
A lessee holding under a valid lease also has a
property interest protected by the takings clause of the
constitutional provisions:
It has been judicially established that
lessees for years or from year to year,
holding under a valid devise, grant, or
lease, have such an interest in property as
to be classed as "owners" in the
constitutional sense, and to be entitled to
compensation for the taking of their
interest . . . .
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.06, at 5-97 to 101 (3d ed.
1989).
We conclude that Colman has alleged a property
interest protectible under article I, section 22 of the Utah
Constitution. We emphasize again that we regard the
allegations of the complaint as true. We do not look to
evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing.
Colman cannot recover if the State proves that in fact there
was no canal or that Colman had no legal rights in the canal.
Colman can only recover for the taking of property to the
extent that property exists and to the extent he has legal
rights in that property.
B. Was Colman's canal "taken or damaged" for purposes of
article I, section 22?
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution
provides, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation." This Court has
previously outlined what constitutes a taking and what
constitutes damage under this constitutional provision.
5
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In State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District
Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502
(1937), the Court stated that a -taking- is -any substantial
interference with private property which destroys or materially
lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed."
94 Utah at 394, 78 P.2d at 506 (quoting Stockdale v. Rio Grande
Western Rv. Co., 28 Utah 201, 211, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904)); see
Hampton v. State Road Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 347, 445 P.2d
708, 711-12 (1968). This Court has also defined the term
-damage- for the purpose of article I, section 22 and for the
purpose of the eminent domain statute in Board of Education of
Logan Citv School District v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d
697 (1962). In that case, the Court cited article I,
section 22 and stated:
Damages to land, by the construction of a
public or industrial improvement, though no
part thereof is taken as provided for under
78-34-10(3), contrary to the rule for
severance damages, is limited to injuries
that would be actionable at common law, or
where there has been some physical
disturbance of a right, either public or
private, which the owner enjoys in
connection with his property and which gives
it additional value, and which causes him to
sustain a special damage with respect to his
property in excess of that sustained by the
public generally.
13 Utah 2d at 313-14, 373 P.2d at 699; ££e State ex rel. Road
Comm'n v. Williams. 22 Utah 2d 331, 334, 452 P.2d 881, 883-84

(19 69); Twenty-Second Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Dav Saints v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 238, 247,
103 P. 243, 246 (1909) ("[Tjo bring the case within the damage
clause of the Constltuti on.,,, -there must-±>e ,some. physical
interference with the property itself or with some easement
which constitutes an appurtenant thereto.-). The Court went on
to explain that such "damage- requires a "definite physical
injury cognizable to the senses with a perceptible effect on
the present market value." Croft, 13 Utah 2d at 314, 373 P.2d
at 699. The Court listed various types of injuries that would
be compensable as "damage" under the constitutional provision.
These included "drying up wells^ and sjprings," "destroying
lateral supports," "preventing surface waters from running off
adjacent lands or running surface waters onto adjacent lands,"
or "depositing of cinders and other foreign materials on
neighboring lands by the permanent operation of the business or
improvement established on the adjoining lands." Croft, 13
Utah 2d at 314, 373 P.2d at 699-700.
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In our recent case of Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores,
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), we
stated: "Plaintiffs alleged that damages [from the flooding]
resulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence and not a
permanent, continuous, or inevitably recurring interference
with property rights usually associated with and requisite in a
compensable taking." 784 P.2d at 465 (citing Sanguinetti v.
United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924); Accardi v. United
States, 220 Ct. CI. 347, 356-57, 599 F.2d 423, 429 (1979);
Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 334, 678 P.2d 803,

818 (1984)). See also koretto v, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982).
Colman alleged in his complaint that the breach would
result in the total destruction of at least a 300-foot segment
of the canal. He also alleged that the breach would create
such turbidity in the area of the canal that the remaining
portions of the canal would be filled with sediment over much
of its course. Colman alleged that the breach would require
that he move the canal and pumps to another location free from
the current caused by the breach. We conclude that Colman has
alleged a permanent or recurring interference with property
rights. Thus, Colman has alleged sufficient facts to
constitute a "taking" or "damage" under article I, section 22.
C. Was Colman's property "taken or damaged" or merely
regulated under the State's general police powers?
The State suggests that because the breach of the
causeway was a valid exercise of the State's police powers, it
is not liable for the damage caused to Colman. However, in
Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974),
we plainly stated, "The constitutional guarantee of just
compensation for the taking or damaging of private property for
public use is in no way affected by the fact that the
expropriator . . . exercis[ed] the police power." 526 P.2d at
928.
The State seems to have misled itself on this point by
relying on isolated language from discussions of a related but
different issue. It is true that the courts will not disturb
the legislature's judgment in the exercise of the general
police powers as long as it does not violate constitutional
limits. Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 355, 145 P.
1047, 1048-49 (1915). The police powers are not, however7
beyond the limitations established by the constitution.
Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 125-26, 292 P. 194, 202
(1930).
The emphasis the State places on the police powers is
often made when there is a close issue that turns on the
difference between a taking or damage under article I,
section 22 and mere regulation of property and activities on
7
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property. Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a
property owner can do with and on the owner's property. Those
regulations may have a significant impact on the utility or
value of property, yet they generally do not require
compensation under article I, section 22. Only when
governmental action rises to the level of a taking or damage
under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay
compensation.
issue.

Previous cases of this Court have wrestled with the
In Bountiful Citv v, De Luca, the Court stated:
Broad and comprehensive as are the
police powers of the state, still we think
it mav not successfully be contended that
the power mav be so exercised as to
infringe upon or invade rights safeguarded
and guaranteed by constitutional
provisions. . . . The cases are numerous
to the effect that . . . the state may
without compensation regulate and restrain
the use of private property when the
health, safety, morals, or welfare of the
public requires or demands it; . . . that
the exercise of proper police regulations
may to some extent prevent enjoyment of
individual rights in property or cause
inconvenience or loss to the owner, does
not necessarily render the police law
unconstitutional, for the reason that such
laws are not considered as appropriating
private property for a public use, but
simply as regulating its use and enjoyment,
and if the owner through a lawful exercise
of the power suffers inconvenience, injury,
or a loss, it is regarded as damnum absque
injuria, provided always, that
constitutional mandates have not been
invaded by 9 confiscgtion, destruction, or
deprivation of property, unless it is per
se injurious or obnoxious or a menace to
public health or public safety or morals or
general welfare, or unless under conditions
similar to tearing down a building to
prevent spreading of a conflagration; but
however broad the scope of the police
power, it is always subject to the rule
that the Legislature may not exercise any
power expressly or impliedly forbidden by
constitutional provisions.

77 Utah at 119-121, 292 P.2d at 199-200 (emphasis added). In
Salt Lake Citv v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 362, 145 P. 1047, 1051
No. 860331
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(1915), we held that M a landowner cannot complain because he is
inconvenienced in the use of his property, where such
inconvenience arises out of the proper enforcement of the
police power to protect the public health, and where such
enforcement does not amount to a taking or destruction of his
property,"
Here, Colman argues that the State's actions were not
a mere regulation of property, but constituted an actual
physical taking. It is not relevant that the State's action in
this case was a valid exercise of its police power. Rather,
the issue is whether sufficient facts were alleged to show a
taking of property.
It is not alleged that Colman was causing a nuisance
on the property. Thus, the case does not fall into the
exception for the abatement of nuisances.
D. Does the State avoid liability because its action was in
response to an emergency?
The State argues that no liability should be
on it because the breach destroyed the canal to avert
overwhelming destruction of property. Colman argues,
that that principle only applies when the plaintiff's
would have been destroyed by the emergency condition
irrespective of the governmental action.

imposed
an
however,
property

Colman correctly states that many of the cases involve
situations where the plaintiff's property would have been
destroyed by the emergency even if there had been no
governmental action,. See United States v. Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952); Sanauinetti v. United
States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924). Colman argues that the
"emergency" created by the higher lake waters did not affect
the operation of the canal. However, the trial court must
determine whether Colman's canal would have been in danger
without the breach.
Other cases dealing with emergencies and eminent
domain can be distinguished because they involve questions of
proper regulation and the use of the police power as discussed
above. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Teresi v.
State, 180 Cal. App. 3d 239, 225 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1986). These
cases do not involve a direct physical taking, as is alleged in
this "case.
However, all of the cases dealing with this emergency
doctrine cannot be distinguished on these bases. The State
argues correctly that in some cases there is no liability where
property is destroyed by a governmental entity to prevent
imminent public catastrophe. The privilege to take or damage
private property without compensation arises from the necessity
9
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of sacrificing some property to prevent overwhelming damage or
loss of life. This privilege is based on the privilege of any
individual to take immediate action that harms property so as
to prevent loss of life or great destruction of property. City
of Rapid City v. Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 65 (S.D. 1978). This
exception to the general requirement of just compensation for
property taken is explained in 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain
§§ 1.43[1] and 1.43[2]:
More closely allied to the power of
eminent domain is the power of destruction
from necessity. In the case of fire,
flood, pestilence or other great public
calamity, when immediate action is
necessary to save human life or to avert an
overwhelming destruction of property, any
individual may lawfully enter another's
land and destroy his property, real or
personal, providing he acts with reasonable
judgment.

If the individual who enters and
destroys private property happens to be a
public officer whose duty it is to avert an
impending calamity, the rights of the owner
of the property to compensation are no
greater than in the case of a private
individual. The most familiar example of
the exercise of this right is seen in case
of fire. ..The neighbors and fireman freely
trespass on the adjoining land, and houses
are even blown up to prevent the spread of
the conflagration. The danger of flood or
the existence of a pestilence may call for
equally drastic action. However, the
permanent appropriation of private property
without the payment of compensation
therefor cannot be justified under the
power.
1 Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 1.43[1], 1.43[2], at 1-841 to
843 (3d ed. 1989) (footnotes omitted). This exception only
applies where there is an extreme, imperative, or overwhelming
necessity. Mere expediency is insufficient. Boland"271"
N.W.2d at 66. There must be "circumstances of imminent
necessity." Srb v. Board of County Comm'rs, 43 Colo. App. 14,
18, 601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1979), cert, denied as improvidentlv
granted, 199 Colo. 496, 618 P.2d 1105 (1980). This exception
must be narrowly construed. Almost every act of taking
property under the eminent domain powers involves some degree
of public necessity. This exception could overcome the rule of
No. 860331
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just compensation if it is not limited to lonly the most extreme
emergencies. In McKell v. Spanish Fork Citv, 6 Utah 2d 92, 305
P.2d 1097 (1957), this Court outlined howja governmental entity
or any riparian owner could protect itself against
extraordinary floods without liability:
However, it is generally recognised that
riparian owners may embank and protect
their lands against the overflow of
extraordinary floods, even though damage to
the lands of others is caused thereby. An
extraordinary flood is one which is not
foreshadowed by the usual course of nature,
and is of such a magnitude and
destructiveness as could not havfe been
anticipated or provided against py the
exercise of ordinary foresight.
McRell. 6 Utah 2d at 95-96, 305 P.2d at 1099 (emphasis in
original). McKell involved an extraordinary flood. Here, it
is a question of fact whether the rising water level
constituted an "extraordinary flood*' and whether there were
otherwise circumstances of overwhelming necessity. These
questions cannot be decided on the basis (of the pleadings and
will have to be decided at trial.
Also involved in this case is the State's role in
creating the emergency. Colman alleged that Southern Pacific
is the owner of a right-of-way granted by the State over the
bed of the lake for the construction of the causeway. It
appears that the State played some role in the construction of
the causeway, and the causeway seems to be the major factor in
causing the "emergency" the State is now claiming. It is more
difficult to find an emergency of overwhelming necessity when
the State played a part in creating the circumstances causing
the emergency. See McKell, 6 Utah 2d at|96-97, 305 P.2d at
1099-1100.
Nichols on Eminent Domain makes!clear that the
permanent appropriation of property without compensation does
not fit into this exception. 1 Nichols <bn Eminent Domain
§ 1.43[2], at 1-843 (3d ed. 1989); see sftort v. Pierce County,
194 Wash. 421, 435-36, 78 P.2d 610, 616 ( 1 9 3 8 ) . I n this case,
Colman alleges a permanent, taking of his|property. This is
another question^ of_f_a_ct for the trial cburt to determine.
On remand, the trial court must' determine whether the
emergency exception applies in this instance. To fall within
this exception, the trial court must find that the flooding
created a situation of extreme, imperati ve, or overwhelming
necessity. In addition, the exception i s not applicable if the
State played a foreseeable role in causi ng the emergency.

11
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IV.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Colman's complaint states a cause of action for
inverse condemnation of his property. Colman alleged that the
destruction of his canal constitutes a taking of his property
without just compensation in violation of article I, section 22
of the Utah Constitution. The State and Southern Pacific claim
that they are immune from this inverse condemnation claim under
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1
to -38. (1989).1 The issue is whether an inverse
condemnation claim under article I, section 22 is subject to
the limitations found in the Governmental Immunity Act.
This Court has struggled since the turn of the century
to reconcile the doctrine of sovereign immunity with article I,
section 22 of the Utah Constitution, which provides simply that
M
[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation." Early and recent cases provide
valuable insight into the meaning of this provision.
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1895
spent a great deal of time formulating and debating the
language of article I, section 22. The debates show that the
delegates believed that the provision limited state government
and was not merely advice that the legislature could choose to

follow if it wished.

See Proceedings and Debates of the

Constitutional Convention, 326-344, 623-53 (1898). The
specific issue of the relation between sovereign immunity and
article I, section 22 never arose in these debates. However,
the more general issue of the role of the constitution in
relation to the role of legislature was frequently discussed
during the debates on article I, section 22. Throughout these
discussions, the delegates assumed that article I, section 22
would be a limitation on the state and that further legislation
would provide no less protection than that mandated by
article I, section 22. Proceedings and Debates of the
Constitutional Convention, 625, 629-33 (1898) (indicating that
the delegates saw the constitutional provision as the minimum
1. In 1987, the legislatures waived its asserted immunity by
adding § 63-30-10.5 to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
1987 Utah Laws ch. 75, § 3. That section provides:
(1) Immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived for the
recovery of compensation from the
governmental entity when the governmental
entity has taken or damaged private
property without just compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be
assessed according to the requirements of
Chapter 34, Title 78.
However, this provision was not in place at the time this cause
of action arose and does not apply here.
No. 860331
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expected of the state and the legislature). The framers of the
Utah Constitution expected it to act as a real limit on the
powers of the state. The framers certainly did not intend to
allow state government to override the constitutional guarantee
with a legislative enactment.
This Court originally held that article I, section 22
was self-executing. Webber v. Salt Lake Citv, 40 Utah 221,
224, 120 P. 503, 504 (1911). Later, the Court switched to a
position that the state was immune from suit for damages under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that article I,
section 22 was not self-executing. Fairclough v. Salt Lake
County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). We now reaffirm
that article I, section 22 is self-executing. In doing so,
clarity requires that we specify the cases that the Court
overrules.
The question of whether article I, section 22 is
self-executing involves the issue of whether the constitutional
provision requires a legislative enactment to be enforced in
the courts. As the law developed in this state, the question
of whether article I, section 22 is self-executing gave rise to
the specific issue of whether the legislature can block
enforcement of article I, section 22 against the state or its
political subdivisions by a grant of immunity.
In Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah
201, 77 P. 849 (1904), the Court stated that "a party whose
property is about to be specially damaged in any substantial
degree for public use has the same rights and is given the same
remedies for the protection of his property from the threatened
injury as would be accorded him if his property was actually
taken and appropriated for such use." 28 Utah at 213, 77 P. at
853. See State ex rel. State Road Comm'n v. District Court,
Fourth Judicial Dist., 94 Utah 384, 393, 78 P.2d 502, 506
(1937). In Stockdale. the Court referred to the discussions in
the Constitutional Convention to support that proposition. 28
Utah at 213, 77 P. at 853. Nevertheless, the Court later
ignored the principle-that "takings* and-"damages" should be
afforded the same remedies.
In Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503
(1911), the Court explicitly held that article I, section 22
was self-executing and the right to recover consequential
damages for damage to property did not rely on legislative
enactment. 40 Utah_at„224, 120 P. at 504; see Coalter v. Salt
Lake City,- 40^ Utah_293,_298_ 12CL_P^_a51_853_X-19JL2)
("Consequential damages to property which are caused by making
public improvements are recoverable under the Constitution of
this state, and not by virtue of a statute.").
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913),
did not deal with article I, section 22, but it seems to have
13
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led to confusion in subsequent decisions dealing with sovereign
immunity in the context of that provision. See Fairclouqh v.
Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 425, 354 P.2d 105, 110-11
(1960) (Wade, J., dissenting). In Wilkinson, the plaintiff
sought recovery from a state fund for damage to his property
caused by flooding from a canal the state had constructed. The
Court stated that without the consent of the state an action
against the sovereign could not be maintained: "We have
neither a statute nor a constitutional provision authorizing a
suit against the state." 42 Utah at 492, 134 P. at 630.
Eight years later, the Court again stated that
article I, section 22 was binding on the state as sovereign.
In Croft v. Millard County Drainage District No. 1, 59 Utah
121, 202 P. 539 (1921), the Court stated:
Even the state itself, when acting
within the scope of its sovereign powers,
cannot take or damage private property for
public use without making just and adequate
compensation to the person to whom the
property belongs.
This is a fundamental law of the
commonwealth, binding upon every department
of the state government. It is the duty of
the courts to give it full force and effect
whenever it is properly invoked by one
claiming its protection, even as against
the sovereign power of the state.
59 Utah at 126, 202 P. at 541 (emphasis added).
Campbell Building Co, v. State Road Commission, 95
Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937), was like Wilkinson in holding
that an action could not be maintained against the state
without its consent. It was also like Wilkinson in that it did
not deal with article I, section 22.
State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District Court,
Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937), held
that the individual commissioners of the State Road Commission
could be enjoined from pursuing a highway project until
payments for consequential damage were made to property
owners. Because this action was-brought before the-improvement
was constructed," the property "owners' sought" an injunction—not
damages. Because of this, the Court did not consider in depth
the relation of sovereign immunity to article I, section 22.
The Court simply stated that the state could not be sued
without its consent and cited Wilkinson and Campbell as
authority. 94 Utah at 389, 78 P.2d at 504. As mentioned
above, neither of those cases dealt with sovereign immunity in
the context of an article I, section 22 claim.
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The Court did state, however, that "it is clear that
the framers of the Constitution did not intend to give the
rights granted by section 22, and then leave the citizen
powerless to enforce such rights." 94 Utah at 397, 78 P.2d at
508- The Court then stated in dicta that if an injunction
would not adequately protect the constitutional right, then the
state could be found to have consented to suit against itself
under article I, section 22. 94 Utah at 399, 78 P.2d at 509.
Nevertheless, this and other similar dicta were soon
ignored in the later cases. Anderson Investment Corp. v.
State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144 (1972); Hiorth v.
Whittenburq, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952). In Hiorth, the
Court held that the road commissioners individually could not
be sued for consequential damages done to property in regrading
for a highway project. 121 Utah at 330, 241 P.2d at 909.
Chief Justice Wolfe concurred and stated that Hiorth overruled
State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District Court, Fourth
Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937). Hiorth,
121 Utah at 331, 241 P.2d at 910.
In Sprinaville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100,
349 P.2d 157 (1960), the plaintiff tried to circumvent N
sovereign immunity and the holding in Hiorth by seeking a writ
of mandamus to compel the members of the State Road Commission
to initiate eminent domain proceedings to assess consequential
damages to the plaintiff's property. The Court held that
sovereign immunity could not be circumvented in that way.
Sprinaville Banking, 10 Utah 2d at 103, 349 P.2d at 159.
In Fairclouah v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354
P.2d 105 (1960), we held that "Art. I, Sec. 22 of our
Constitution is not self-executing, nor does it give consent to
be sued, implied or otherwise; and that to secure such consent
is a legislative matter . . . ." 10 Utah 2d at 419, 354 P.2d
at 106 (footnotes omitted). Fairclough was followed in State
ex rel. Road Commission v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585
(1962), and in Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d
4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973).
In Hampton v. State ex rel. Road Commission, 21 Utah
2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968), the Court took a less restrictive
position on the issue of compensation from the state. In
Hampton, the plaintiffs' right of access to their property was
interfered with by the construction ;of Interstate 15. The
Court held that the state had given its~consent~to be~ sued for
the taking of property under Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-9 (1953).
The Court held that if the action of the state amounted to a
"substantial and material impairment of access to their
property," then it constituted a taking requiring compensation
from the state. 21 Utah 2d at 348, 445 P.2d at 712. Thus, the
Court made it possible for the plaintiff to recover by
classifying the plaintiffs' damages as a taking, for which
15
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immunity had been waived by statute, rather than as damage, for
which the plaintiff could not recover under Fairclouah.
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), held the
state liable because the state's conduct, which led to the
damages sustained by the plaintiffs, fell within the
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann, § 63-30-9 (1953),
although Judge Bullock, sitting pro tempore, dissented and
argued that article I, section 22 was self-executing and should
be applied- 541 P.2d at 1122 (Bullock, D.J., dissenting). In
dissent in separate cases, Justice Wade and Judge Bullock both
cited many cases from other states holding that similar state
constitutional provisions are self-executing. See Andrus v.
State, 541 P.2d at 1123 n.6 (Bullock, D.J., dissenting);
Sprinaville Banking Co, v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d at 105-09, 349
P.2d at 159-62 (Wade, J., dissenting). Today the overwhelming
majority of states with similar constitutional provisions hold
them to be self-executing.2
The history of these cases shows that for a time the
Court's concentration on the doctrine of sovereign immunity
caused it to neglect this constitutional provision, which was
2. The following states hold their constitutional provisions
requiring just compensation for taking or damaging private
property to be self-executing or otherwise binding on the
state.
ALABAMA. Ala. Const, art. I, § 23 (M[B]ut private property
shall not be taken for, or applied to public use, unless just
compensation be first made therefor . . . • " ) ; City of Fairhope
v. Raddcliffe, 48 Ala. App. 224, 229, 263 So. 2d 682, 686
(1972) (authority to sue for damage caused by negligent
construction of sewer system arises from Alabama constitution,
not from statutory waiver of sovereign immunity).
ALASKA. Alaska Const, art. I, § 18 ("Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation."); State, Dept. of Highways v. Crosbv, 410 P.2d
724, 728-29 (Alaska 1966) (basis of action was article I,
section 18 of the Alaska constitution).
ARIZONA. Ariz. Const, art. II, § 17 ("No private property
shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without
just compensation having first been made . . . . • " ) ; Pima County
v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 370, 351 P.2d 647, 649 (1960) ("This
Court has previously held section 17, article 2, of the Arizona
Constitution to be self-executing (County of'Mohave" v.
Chamberlin, 78 Afiz7 422, 28T7P72d 17877 and i"t T s "perf ectTy
clear that the absence of enabling legislation cannot deprive
plaintiff of his constitutional right to just compensation for
any of his private property which is 'taken or damaged1 by the
County. w ).
CALIFORNIA. Cal. Const, art. I, § 19 ("Private property may be
taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation,
ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or
(continued on p. 17)
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designed to protect individual rights. This elevation of
legislation and common law principles over a clear
constitutional limitation strikes at the heart of constitutional
(footnote 2 continued)
into court for, the owner. M ); Pacific Outdoor Advertising Co.
v. Citv of Burbank, 86 Cal. App. 3d 5, 9, 149 Cal. Rptr. 906,
909 (1978) ("[Article I, section 19] requires no statutory
implementation, since it is self-executing."); Rose v. State.
19 Cal. 2d 713, 726, 123 P.2d 505, 513 (1942) ("Immunity from
suit cannot avail in this instance, and, if no statute exists,
liability still exists, because as to this provision the
Constitutions are self-executing.") (quoting Chick Springs
Water Co. v. State Hwv. Dept., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842
(1931)).
COLORADO. Colo. Const, art. II, § 15 ("Private property shall
not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without
just compensation."); Srb v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 43
Colo App. 14, 19, 601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1979) (the just
compensation clause of the Colorado constitution creates an
exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity), cert,
denied as improvidentlv granted, 199 Colo. 496, 618 P.2d 1105
(1980).
GEORGIA. Ga. Const, art. I, § 3, 1f 1 ("[Pjrivate property
shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just
and adequate compensation being first paid."); Fulton County v.
Baranan, 240 Ga. 837, 838, 242 S*E.2d 617, 619 (1978) (action
for damage done to private property by county not barred by
statute granting counties immunity from liability).
ILLINOIS. 111. Const, art. I, § 15 ("Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation as provided by law."); People ex rel. Alexander v.
Citv of Mount Vernon, 404 111. 58, 66, 88 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1949)
("The provision of the constitution guaranteeing compensation
if property is taken or damaged for public use is
self-executing, requires no legislation for its enforcement,
and cannot be impaired by. legislation, or ordinance.").
KENTUCKY. Ky. Const. § 13 ("[N]or shall any man's property be
taken or applied to public use without the consent of his
representatives and without just compensation being previously
made to him."); Hollowav Constr. Co. v. Smith, 683 S.W.2d 248
(Ky. 1984) (state waives immunity for suits under takings
clause); Kentucky Bell Corp. v. Commonwealth. 295 Ky. 21, 25,
172 S.W.2d 661, 663 (1943) (the constitutional provisions
"support the rule th_at„ ._._.__ where a\ trespass . _ . .amounts to
[a] taking, the state's immunity from suit is waived . . . " ) .
LOUISIANA. La. Const, art. I, § 4 ("Property shall not be
taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions
except for public purposes and with just compensation
• • • • " ) ; Revmond v. State ex rel. Dep't. of Highways, 255 La.
425, 447, 231 So. 2d 375, 383 (1970) (constitutional provision
supports suit for inverse condemnation by property owner);
Anoelle v. State. 212 La. 1069, 1076, 34 So. 2d 321, 323 (1948)
(continued on p. 18)
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government. The people of Utah established the Utah
Constitution as a limitation on the power of government.

It

(footnote 2 continued)
("This provision, which is similar to that appearing in other
State Constitutions, has been generally regarded as
self-executing.").
MINNESOTA. Minn. Const, art. I, § 13 ("Private property shall
not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just
compensation therefor, first paid or secured."); State v.
Prow's Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 171 N.W.2d 83 (1969) (property
owner is entitled to damages for constitutional taking).
MISSISSIPPI. Miss. Const, art. Ill, § 17 ("Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use, except on due
compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof
. . . . " ) ; State Highway Comm'n v. Mason, 192 Miss. 576, 593, 4
So. 2d 345, 349 (1941) ("It would be a mockery Eor the
Constitution to guarantee a right to the property owner, and a
duty on the taker thereof, and leave the enforcement of both
dependent upon the legislative will.").
MISSOURI. Mo. Const, art. I, § 26 ([P]rivate property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation."); Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist.,
377 S.W.2d 348, 354 (Mo. 1964) ("While the state cannot be sued
without its consent, and there is no statutory provision
authorizing such suits, nevertheless, 'if the injury alleged is
a damage within the constitutional provision, that provision is
self-enforcing.'") (quoting Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage &
Levee Dist., 309 Mo. 189, 274 S.W. 448, 455 (1925)).
MONTANA. Mont. Const, art. II, § 29 ("Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation to the full extent of the loss . . . . " ) ; City of
Three Forks v. State Highway Comm'n, 156 Mont. 392, 398, 480
P.2d 826, 830 (1971) (the constitutional provision prohibiting
the taking or damaging of private property without just
compensation waives the immunity of the state where that
provision applies).
NEBRASKA. Neb. Const, art. I, § 21 ("The property of no person
shall be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation therefor,"); Kula v. Prososki, 219 Neb. 626, 629,
365 N.W.2d 441, 443 (1985) ("[Article I, section 21] of the
Constitution is self-executing, and legislative action is not
necessary to make the remedy available.").
NEW MEXICO. N.M. Const, art. II, § 20 ("Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for~ public use without :iust
compensation."); McClure'v. Town~of~Mesilla"r 93 N7M~ 4477 448,
601 P.2d 80, 81 (Ct. App. 1979) (citing Summerford v. Board of
Commr's of Dona Ana County, 35 N.M. 374, 379, 298 P. 410, 413
(1931) (plaintiff property owner could base suit on article II,
section 20)).
NORTH DAKOTA. N.D. Const, art. I, § 16 ("Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation . . . . " ) ; Jamestown Plumbing & Heating Co. v.
(continued on p. 19)
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can hardly be maintained that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, alone among all doctrines, is oiktside of the
(footnote 2 continued)
Citv of Jamestown, 164 N.W.2d 355, 358 (NiD, 1968) ("We have
held on numerous occasions that under this constitutional
provision the owner may maintain an action to recover damages
for the taking of his property and for consequential damages to
his property resulting from a public use.r).
SOUTH DAKOTA. S.D. Const, art. VI, § 13 ^"Private property
shall not be taken for public use, or damaged, without just
compensation . . . . " ) ; Hurley v. State, 82 S.D. 156, 170, 143
N.W.2d 722, 729 (1966) ("In the absence ojf an adequate remedy
provided by the legislature which condemnees may invoke in such
cases, Section 13, Article VI of our Constitution is deemed to
be self-executing granting them a right o|f trial by jury in the
circuit courts of our state.").
TEXAS. Tex. Const, art. I, § 17 ("No perk[son's property shall
be taken, damaged or destroyed for or appilied to public use
without adequate compensation being made ,
. " ) ; San Antonio
River Authority v. Lewis, 363 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1962) ("The
provisions of Section 17, Article I of the Constitution of
Texas applies as well to the State and its agencies as to
private corporations.").
I
VIRGINIA. Va. Const, art. I, § 11 ("[N]dr any law whereby
private property shall be taken or damaged for public uses,
without just compensation • . . . " ) ; Heldt v. Elizabeth River
Tunnel Dist.. 196 Va. 477, 482, 84 S.E.2d 511, 515 (1954) ("It
is well settled that such a constitutional provision is
self-executing and the landowner may enforce his constitutional
right to compensation in a common-law action.").
WASHINGTON. Wash. Const, art. I, § 16 ('JNo private property
shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without
just compensation having been first made . . . . " ) ; Kincaid v.
Citv of Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 621, 134 P. 504, 506 (1913)
("The city is bound to make compensation J under a compact no
less formal than.the_constitution itself\ and it cannot defeat
this constitutional right by a charter provision or an
ordinance, nor can the legislature take it away by any
arbitrary requirement . . . . " ) .
[
WEST VIRGINIA. W. Va. Const, art. Ill, § 9 ("Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public[use, without just
compensation . . . . " ) ; Johnson v. City 6f Parkersburg, 16 W.
Va. 402, 422-23 (1880) ("I have nowhere keen it contended that
the clause of a Constitution, which,declares, that 'private
property shall not be taken for public" use without "just
compensation,' requires legislation to p[it it in force. It has
always been regarded as self executing. ( It is a limitation,
not only upon the rights of individuals pnd corporations, but
also upon the Legislatures of the States!,
The court proceeds
to hold that the result is the same if the constitutional
provision covers damages as well.).
WYOMING. Wyo. Const, art. I, § 33 ("Private property shall not
(continued on p. 20)
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limitations the people established.
P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), we stated:

In Dean v. Rampton, 556

The purpose of a constitution is to provide
an orderly foundation for government and to
keep even the sovereign . . . within its
bounds. Therefore, the legislative power
itself must be exercised within the
framework of the constitution.
Accordingly, it has been so long
established and universally recognized, as
to be hardly necessary to state, that if a
statutory enactment contravenes any
provision of the constitution, the latter
governs.
556 P.2d at 206-07 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2
L. Ed. 60 (1803)) .
(footnote 2 continued)
be taken or damaged for public or private use without just
compensation."); State Highway Comm'n v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390,
395 (Wyo. 1966) ("However, the legislature cannot infringe upon
or take from property owners the right to be compensated,
according to the requirement of art. I, § 33.").
The law in three states differs from the positions of
these courts.
ARKANSAS. Ark. Const, art. II, § 22 ("[A]nd private property
shall not be taken, appropriated or damaged for public use,
without just compensation therefor.") (law on this issue is
unclear).
OKLAHOMA. Okla. Const, art. II, § 24 ("Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation."); State ex rel. Department of Transp. v. Hoebel,
594 P.2d 1213, 1214-15 (Okla. 1979) (under the Oklahoma
constitution, a claim in inverse condemnation for a taking for
a public use is not subject to sovereign immunity, but a claim
for damages i s ) .
PENNSYLVANIA. Pa. Const, art. I, § 10 ("[N]or shall private
property be taken or applied to public use, without authority
of law and without just compensation being first made or
secured."). The law on this issue is not clear in
Pennsylvania, but a recent case indicates that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would' hold-it"ttr~be~self -^executing . --Hucrhes -v:
Commonwealth Dep't. of TransPTT 514 P a — 300 r 306 r~523 A.2d 747,
750 (1987) ("What is 'just compensation1 cannot be determined
by the exclusive fiat of the General Assembly, for like all
others they cannot be the judge in their own case. The
determination of what is 'just' between the Commonwealth and a
condemnee is the function of the judiciary.").
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In sum, article I, section 22 nefeds no legislation to
activate it; it is mandatory and obligatory as it is. See Utah
Const, art. I, § 24.
The trial court concluded that Southern Pacific acted
as the State's contractor on the causeway breach project and
was therefore protected by the State's immunity. Since we hold
that the State is not immune, Southern Palcific can no longer
depend on the State's immunity. We express no opinion as to
Southern Pacific's argument of derivative immunity based on its
status as the State's contractor for the project.
V.

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

The trial court held that the breaching of the
causeway was in furtherance of the Statejs public trust
responsibilities and that the State could not be liable for the
damage allegedly done to Colman's canal. The State maintains
that it can take any action relating to the lake that is in the
public interest and be immune from liability for that action.
Colman argues that the public trust doctrine does not apply to
flood control, but only to certain limited purposes, such as
commerce, fishing, navigation, and perhaps recreational use and
preservation of ecological integrity.
The controlling case on this issue is Illinois Central
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), where the United
States Supreme Court discussed the public trust doctrine and
held that the Illinois legislature's earjLier grant to the
railroad of lands submerged under Lake Michigan could be
revoked by a later legislature because tne earlier grant was in
violation of the public trust the state held over the waters.
The essence of this doctrine is that navigable waters
should not be given without restriction Ito private parties and
should be preserved for the general public for uses such as
commerce, navigation, and fishing. Recent cases have examined
this doctrine in deciding whether the stjate could grant uses of
public waters to private parties. See, b.a., Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, [inc., 105 Idaho 622,
671 P.2d 1085 (1983).
This case, however, presents a different problem. The
State has already exercised its powers under the public trust
in leasing the canal on the bed of the 1<ake" to" Colman. - Now;
the State wishes to revoke" that grant~'wiithout"compensation tc
Colman. The State maintains that it can do so since it holds
the waters of the lake under the public (trust. In taking such
a position, the State essentially argued that it originally
acted without authority in granting the lease to Colman.
question.

Illinois Central provides some guidance on this
The Supreme Court stated:
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But the decisions are numerous which
declared that such property is held by the
State, by virtue of its sovereignty, in
trust for the public. The ownership of the
navigable waters of the harbor and of the
lands under them is a subject of public
concern to the whole people of the State.
The trust with which they are held,
therefore, is governmental and cannot be
alienated, except in those instances
mentioned of parcels used in the
improvement of the interest thus held, or
when parcels can be disposed of without
detriment to the public interest in the
lands and waters remaining.
146 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court made
clear that a state can grant certain rights in navigable waters
if those rights can be disposed of without affecting the public
interest in what remains. 146 U.S. at 453. At this point in
the litigation, there is nothing to show that Colman's canal
impaired the public interest in any way at the time the State
granted him the right to conduct his operation. This is a
question of fact to be decided by the trial court.
VI.

SPECIAL LEGISLATION

Colman argues on appeal that the Great Salt Lake
Causeway Act (the "Act") was beyond legislative authority and
constituted special legislation in violation of article VI,
section 26 of the Utah Constitution. Article VI, section 26
provides, "No private or special law shall be enacted where a
general law can be applicable." In this case, the Act provided
indemnity to Southern Pacific for actions arising out of the
breach of the causeway.
The fact that legislation benefited one individual
does not prove a violation of article VI, section 26. Hulbert
v. State, 607 P.2d--1217^ 1223 . (Utah -1980) . - The standards forjudging challenged legislation under this provision were stated
by this Court in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah
Insurance Guaranty Association, 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977):
A general law applies to and operates
uniformly upon all members of any class of
persons, places, or things requiring,
legislation peculiar_to_thems-elv.es in_the.
matters covered by the laws in question.
On the other hand, special legislation
relates either to particular persons,
places, or things or to persons, places or
things which, though not particularized,
are separated by any method of selection
from the whole class to which the law
No. 860331
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might/ but for such legislation, be
applied.
. . . [A] law is general when it
applies egually to all persons embraced in
a class founded upon some natural/ I
intrinsic, or constitutional distinction.
It is special legislation if it confers
particular privileges or imposes peculiar
disabilities/ or burdensome conditions in
the exercise of a common right; upon a
class of persons arbitrarily selected, from
the general body of those who stand in
precisely the same relation to the subject
of the law. The constitutional prohibition
of special legislation does not preclude
legislative classification, but only
requires the classification to be
reasonable.
564 P.2d at 754 (following State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 505,
94 P.2d 414, 420 (1939); People v. Western fruit Growers, Inc.,
22 Cal. 2d 494, 506/ 140 P.2d 13/ 19-20 (1943)).
In the Act, the legislature found that extreme weather
conditions had caused the water level in thp lake to rise
sharply, causing severe flood damage. 1984 Utah Laws ch. 32,
§ 1. It also found that the causeway had claused the water
level in the south arm of the lake to be significantly higher
than the water level in the north arm. Th^ legislature
declared it to be in the public interest to breach the causeway
and authorized the Division of State Lands and Forestry to do
so. The legislature then stated: MIn ord^r to obtain the
cooperation of the Southern Pacific Railroad which is necessary
for the timely accomplishment of the objectives of this act,
the division is authorized to enter into formal agreement with
the railroad for indemnification as follow^ . . . ." 1984 Utah
Laws ch. 32, § 2.
This legislation makes a reasonable classification to
accomplish its purposes of preventing widespread flood damage
to public lands, major transportation routes, and other public
facilities. Southern Pacific owns the causeway. This statute
does not discriminate against anyone since Southern Pacific is
the owner of the causeway and the operator of the railway that
crosses the causeway.- The Act-is-not speqial legislation.in
violation of article—VI-,- section-26.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
is reversed, and the case is remanded to iphe trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

23

No. 860331

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

(Concurring)

I join in all of Justice Stewart's opinion. However,
as to part IIIB, which holds that the allegations of Colman's
complaint are sufficient to state a claim for a taking or
damaging under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution,
I would observe that the precise limits of a taking or damaging
have yet to be carefully or consistently spelled out by this
court. Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1324-25
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). There will be time enough for us to
carefully consider this question in future cases.

Durham, Justice, concurs in the concurring opinion of
Justice Zimmerman.
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